With its supreme leader killed and its war machine under relentless U.S. pressure, Iran now stands largely alone—its longtime partners Russia and China offering nothing more than diplomatic condemnations and expressions of concern.

Tehran has responded to the U.S. and Israeli attacks by widening the conflict beyond the Middle East, firing missiles and drones with an impact that is reverberating through global energy markets, rattling capitals from Washington to Beijing, and paralysing the shipping that carries 20 per cent of the world’s oil supply through the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian missiles reached as far as Cyprus, Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Gulf states, taking the war to their doorstep by targeting critical businesses, energy infrastructure and U.S. bases.

Oil facilities, refineries and key supply routes were hit, causing severe disruption to crude and natural gas supplies.

With the Strait of Hormuz already shut, the attacks have sent energy prices soaring, destabilising global markets and forcing major economies to scramble,  underscoring the world’s exposure to the fallout from Tehran’s response to the war.

Russia and China’s restraint reflected a cold calculation, analysts stated, noting that intervening as Iran faces Israel and the United States would bring high costs, limited gains, and unpredictable risks—burdens neither power appears willing to shoulder.

“Putin has other priorities, and chief among them is Ukraine,” said Anna Borshchevskaya, a Russia expert at the Washington Institute. “It would be foolish for Russia to go into a direct military confrontation with the United States.”

A senior Russian source said, “The escalation in and around Iran and the Gulf is already diverting attention from the war in Ukraine. That’s just a fact. Everything else is just emotion about a ‘fallen ally’,” the source said.

Beijing and Moscow have both helped Iran build military capacity to counter U.S. and Israeli pressure, supplying missiles, air‑defence systems and technology intended to bolster deterrence, complicate U.S. operations and raise the costs of attack. That support, however, now appears capped.

China has spent years embedding itself in Middle Eastern diplomacy, while Russia has cast Iran as a pillar of its anti-Western alignment.

Yet as the conflict flared, both powers were constrained -China by its dependence on Gulf energy and trade and by security priorities in Asia, and Russia by a grinding war in Ukraine that has sapped its capacity to shield partners and sharpened its need to preserve ties with oil-rich Gulf states.

The result is a stark paradox: Iran remains strategically useful to both, but not useful enough to fight for.

With Russia’s military, diplomatic bandwidth, and economic resources still absorbed by the war in Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin’s priority is to avoid escalation with Washington and safeguard Russia’s interests in the Middle East, rather than gamble on Iran’s battlefield fortunes.

“If Russia had supported Iran directly, it would have alienated the Gulf states and ‌Israel,” Ms Borshchevskaya said. “That’s not what Putin wants.”

Beijing’s restrained response reflects a longstanding strategy: avoiding binding security commitments far from its core interests.

Unlike the United States, whose alliances rest on mutual defence obligations, China prefers partnerships built on trade, investment and arms sales, ties that stop short of dragging it into costly conflicts beyond East Asia, said Evan A. Feigenbaum from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Beijing, one of the world’s largest trading powers and energy buyers, maintains ties with Iran and Gulf Sunni rivals, and in Latin America, it never placed all its bets on Venezuela alone.

“If Beijing wanted to do more, it won’t redirect strategic attention or military assets from core security,” argued Henry Tugendhat at the Washington Institute. “It only cares about its name abroad. It cares about Taiwan, the South China Sea, and perceived threats from the U.S. and Japan.”

The conflict may even carry advantages for Beijing. From the sidelines, China can watch as U.S. forces are tied down far from East Asia and military stockpiles are depleted, while gaining a real-time view of American capabilities and operations, insights that could inform its thinking on a future Taiwan scenario.

China’s key vulnerability remains energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, which carries some 45 per cent of its oil imports. But Beijing has already built strategic reserves and substantial volumes of Iranian oil, sitting in tankers or storage, according to experts.

They said the crisis allowed Moscow and Beijing to recast themselves as mediators.

China said its foreign minister, Wang Yi, spoke with European and Arab ministers to press for dialogue, while Putin has held similar calls with Gulf leaders and Iranian officials.

Russia also sees concrete benefits: rising oil prices strengthen its war economy, and a U.S. administration tied up in the Middle East has less bandwidth for Ukraine.

Russia does not benefit from the collapse of the Iranian regime, but it is also not tying its fate to Tehran’s survival, said Ms Borshchevskaya.

Moscow is hedging, preserving flexibility, regardless of the conflict’s outcome, and would build ties with any new government, even one aligned with Washington. The Russian source pointed to Syria as a precedent.

After backing then-President Bashar al‑Assad for years, Moscow still retained its Mediterranean bases and quickly built ties with Syria’s new leader, Ahmed al‑Sharaa, underscoring its willingness to trade loyalty for long-term leverage.

(Reuters/NAN)