Nigeria’s presidential election has an interesting feature this year. Most opinion polls suggest Peter Obi, a third-party politician now rising in media popularity, will defeat the candidates of the two main parties. 

This seems very exciting to many prospective voters and foreigners who have been following the buildup.

There’s just one thing the pollsters are forgetting. 

Nigeria always has popular candidates in its presidential elections, but the men who win ultimately are those who form the best alliances among the political elite. Presidential elections in this country are not popularity contests. They’re alliance contests decided through competitive rigging.

The following is a quick timeline to explain how things really work around here. 

1999 – Obasanjo v Falae

Winner: Obasanjo

Comment: Both frontrunners were Yoruba. The northern establishment stepped aside out of remorse for the annulment of the 1993 election won by Abiola, a Yoruba. 

So, Obasanjo didn’t win in 1999 because he was popular. In fact, he lost heavily in every Yoruba state (including his own Ogun state). Yet, he won that election with the backing of the military class and regional allies.

2003 – Obasanjo v Buhari

Winner: Obasanjo

Comment: Buhari, the spiritual leader of northern Muslims, easily won that segment of the electorate but lost anyway. Obasanjo had broadened support among regional political stakeholders for this re-election bid. 

2007 – Yar’adua v Buhari v Abubakar

Winner: Yar’adua

Comment: Frontrunners were Hausa/Fulani this time. The southern establishment stepped aside because the country’s political elite generally understood that it was the north’s turn to produce the next president. This was according to the zoning rule. 

Buhari again easily won his northern Muslim constituency but failed to build meaningful relationships with other regional stakeholders. Abubakar had little political capital, having been shut out of the ruling party. 

The incumbent Obasanjo virtually had the electoral commission write the results for Yar’adua. The nationwide results were never published, and that election is counted among the worst ever held in the country. 

2011 – Jonathan v Buhari v Ribadu

Winner: Jonathan

Comment: A proposed coalition between Buhari and Tinubu was aborted. Again, Buhari easily won his northern Muslim constituency but failed to build meaningful relationships with key regional actors. 

Ribadu, an upstart and ex-EFCC chair, was popular among the youth. But he came a distant third. While he was running, his own party leader Tinubu was discussing alliances with others to prepare himself for his future bid for the presidency. 

Meanwhile, Jonathan somehow convinced the ruling PDP’s northern leaders that he would serve only one term if they backed him. This was the main condition on which he was allowed to run despite the zoning rule, which disqualified Jonathan at the time. 

2015 – Jonathan v Buhari

Winner: Buhari

Comment: Jonathan reneged on his promise to key stakeholders (esp. in the north) and sought a second term. The north recoiled and rallied behind Buhari, who finally formed the coalition with Tinubu that swept him to power. 

2019 – Buhari v Abubakar

Winner: Buhari

Comment: The Buhari-Tinubu coalition wobbled but was held together by the zoning rule. Tinubu and other southern figures were disgruntled but understood a Buhari re-election was their route to power (eight years of northern rule to be followed by southern rule). Northern Muslims kept faith in their spiritual leader, and other regional stakeholders did their part to keep him in power. 

2023 – Tinubu v Abubakar v Obi v Kwankwaso

Comment: Obi has run an impressively popular campaign but hasn’t followed up that extraordinary effort with key alliances in his backyard and beyond. 

No presidential candidate has ever won a geopolitical zone without most of its state governors on her side. None of the five state governors in Obi’s southeast zone supports his bid – let alone those in other parts of the country. Even Buhari, despite his cult-like following among the country’s largest voting bloc, couldn’t get over the line without alliances with the ruling elite at home and in the other zones. 

The historical evidence tells us that an Obi win in the southeast alone (much less Nigeria) is improbable.

Adedayo Ademuwagun is a political risk consultant.