The failure of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review conference to adopt a consensus outcome document for the third consecutive time signals deep structural vulnerabilities within the global security architecture that must be taken seriously, a leading arms-control expert has warned.

Patricia Jaworek, a director with the Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Global Nuclear Policy Programme, outlined a pragmatic blueprint for sustaining the global disarmament regime.

While acknowledging that the modern diplomatic environment is the most hostile since the height of the Cold War, Ms Jaworek rejected the idea that non-proliferation efforts have reached a dead end. She urged non-nuclear-weapon states to step directly into the leadership vacuum.

“The failure to adopt a consensus outcome document for the third time in a row is disappointing but not surprising,” Ms Jaworek told Peoples Gazette. “The review conference took place in one of the most difficult geopolitical environments since the entry into force of the NPT: Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, U.S. attacks on Iran, Iran’s non-compliance with its safeguards obligations, China’s rapid nuclear modernisation, and the expiration of the last bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.”

Ms Jaworek explained that the failure to adopt a consensus outcome document does not mean the collapse of the treaty, “but it does signal deeper structural issues that should be taken seriously”.

The NTI’s GNPP director noted that the NPT’s foundational grand bargain (where non-nuclear-weapon states forgo atomic arms in exchange for peaceful technology and a concrete commitment to disarmament from nuclear-armed nations) “has become dangerously uneven”.

She pointed out that “when that bargain appears increasingly one-sided, confidence in the regime inevitably erodes”. Ms Jaworek therefore suggested an immediate focus on stabilising the baseline protocols that maintain deterrence stability.

“What needs to be done: Identify where common ground still exists, for example, the reaffirmation of moratoria against the resumption of explosive nuclear testing, norms against proliferation, and the ‘nuclear taboo’.

“Simultaneously, communication cannot be allowed to lapse during the five years leading up to the next formal review cycle. Sustain engagement and dialogue over the next five years, including re-energising dialogue between nuclear-armed states, especially in the P5 format,” Ms Jaworek stated.

Additionally, the nuclear weapons policy expert advocated shifting the balance of power toward non-nuclear-weapon states, reasoning that for decades, global disarmament policy has been held hostage by the five recognised nuclear-weapon states.

Ms Jaworek noted that nuclear-weapon-free zones remain among the most underappreciated tools in the nonproliferation and disarmament regime, as each of the five zones emerged from “complicated geopolitical realities and represented a deliberate choice to reject nuclear weapons”.  

Rather than viewing these zones as passive regional pacts, Ms Jaworek said they must be used as dynamic instruments of international pressure, particularly for smaller countries that are frequently used as proxies in great-power rivalries.

“This is a narrative that matters not only to the P5, but also to countries caught in the crosshairs of great power competition as they reconsider the role of nuclear weapons for their national security,” she explained. “Strengthening NWFZs through the leadership of non-nuclear-weapon states and collaboration between the zones to leverage their collective voice can create pressure on nuclear-weapon states and their allies within the next review cycle.”

Ms Jaworek warned that the international community could not afford to focus solely on traditional threats, noting that if policymakers do not adapt the regulatory framework to address emerging capabilities over the next five years, technological disruption will outpace diplomacy entirely.

“The issue of artificial intelligence and emerging technologies has become a major topic of discussion, and there are major differences between states parties on how to approach this within the NPT regime,” Ms Jaworek stated. “With how rapidly the technologies and their integration with nuclear systems are developing, this will be an important issue to watch during the next review cycle.”

With the next NPT review conference in 2031, Ms Jaworek also weighed in on the risk during the intervening period, saying, “Regional conflicts and tensions have been one of the main challenges at the past three review conferences (Middle East, Russia-Ukraine, United States-Israel-Iran). Without resolutions to these conflicts, and with tensions increasing in other regions, there’s a risk that the security environment will further deteriorate and block any progress in the next review cycle.”